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Abstract. This paper traces the emergence, evolution, and demise of below cost legislation in the grocery industry 
in Ireland.  The paper explores retail buyers’ views of the Grocery Order (1987) and the effect, if any, it had on 
grocery buyer behaviour, competition among retailers, and vertical competition along the food chain until it was 
repealed in 2006.  It addresses the matter of buyers’ likely response to the Order, had it remained in effect, in the 
current depressed market environment.  Views of independent retailers are also provided on the Order. The paper 
finds that grocery buyer behaviour was determined by the buoyant consumer market and that the Groceries Order 
acted to depress competitive forces and direct supplier-buyer negotiations to off-invoice variables.  Had the Order 
remained in place, the effect of the rapid decline in the economy, accompanied by the rapid rise of the discounters’ 
share of the market, the growth in cross border shopping, and the dramatic fall in the value of sterling would have 
ensured that buyers developed new sourcing models which would have made the legislation redundant.  The paper 
concludes that the legislation did not work to the benefit of shoppers but assisted the imposition of a form of quasi-
resale price maintenance by suppliers, which suited suppliers and retailers alike in a time of economic buoyancy. The 
paper endorses the Government’s decision to rescind the order and remove an important constraint in both vertical 
and horizontal competition. 
Keywords: Below cost legislation, Grocery Buyer Behaviour 
1. Introduction 
Given the frequency of purchase and their share of household expenditure, grocery products and their 
prices act as a significant determinant of the level of satisfaction enjoyed by households.  Despite this, 
below  cost  legislation  on  grocery  products  has  occupied  the  minds  of  legislators  in  many  European 
countries for a considerable period of time.  The motivation for such an intervention frequently involves 
the preservation of the existing retail structure and the protection of competitive forces against possible 
predation  by larger competitors.  This paper traces the emergence and the debate surrounding evolution 
of below cost legislation in the Republic of Ireland. It will trace the steps that led to the introduction of 
the legislation in 1989, and the emergence of a definition of below cost that was to result in unanticipated 
responses that served to limit the downward pressure on grocery prices, introduce inefficiecies in both 
retail and  supplier organisations, and stifle  sourcing innovation.   Interviews  with current and former 
buyers from the main grocery buying organisations will inform the debate on the effect of the Order on 
buyer behaviour.  
 
 
Cost versus price 
 
We are concerned with below cost legislation. However the term cost is not as clear as it might initially 
appear and this fact can have undesirable effects on the way legislation is implemented and the behaviours it 
induces among businessses. In particular, it is useful even at this early stage to consider the distinction 
between cost and “net invoice price”.  For the purpose of clarity we shall ignore taxes. The cost a retailer 
incurs in selling a product is made up of two components.  The first component is the amount of money paid 
to the supplier of the product.  This in turn can be broken down into two elements; The first element is the 
price  on  the  invoice  which  may  contain  discounts  based  on  the  size  of  the  order  or  other  economies 
associated with the transaction. The difference between the retail price of the product and this cost yields the 
products gross margin.  The second element, sometimes referred to as supplementary terms, may involve 
incentives and take the form of rebates paid to the retailer based on future performance perhaps achieving 
certain sales targets. These supplementary terms must be added to the gross margin, yielding an adjusted 
gross margin. Deducting the supplementary terms from the price on the invoice yields the real price paid by 
the retailer. The monetary amount of these supplementary terms are unknown at the time of the sale. Further 
difficulties arise because supplementary terms are usually paid on the basis of the totality of business done 
over a period of time.  In general this is not product specific as many suppliers deal with multiple products. 3 
Consequently it is not possible to calculate the real price paid by a retailer to a supplier for a specific product 
at the time of invoice.   
 
However this does not equate to the cost of the product to the retailer.  There is the second cost component to 
be considered. Retailers by necessity incur costs when selling a product. These include overhead costs and 
variable  costs.  Variable  costs  can  display  significant  differences  even  when  we  compare  very  similar 
consumer  products.  For  example,  take  a  steak  butchered  and  prepared  in-store  versus  the  same  product 
prepared and pre-packed by the supplier.  These direct product costs are difficult to apportion to specific 
products. 
 
The “below-cost” legislation embodied in all the variants of the Groceries Order is concerned almost solely 
with our first component of cost which is the amount of money or purchase price paid by the retailer. This 
might be termed as the real price of a product.  The legislation does not, for practicable purposes, attempt to 




The emergence of the groceries order 
 
The 1956 Groceries Order was the first attempt to regulate trading relationships within the grocery sector 
in the Republic of Ireland.  The order emerged in response to changes in the distribution of grocery 
products and the structure of the grocery supply chain.   In overall terms the extent of price competition at 
the time was very limited; the practice of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) was ubiquitous with  most 
product prices being specified by the manufacturer or supplier either through price marking, advertising 
or direct instruction. The Fair Trade Commision’s (FTC) enquiry into the grocery trade during 1955 was 
very progressive for the time in concluding that the extent of price competition in the grocery trade should 
be  stimulated  to  the  benefit  of  the  consumer.    The  legislature  responded  positively  to  the  FTC’s 
recommendations and the resultant 1956 Groceries Order heralded in a new era in the grocery sector.  
Amongst  other  practices,  the  Order  prohibited  resale  price  maintenance  and  collective  price  fixing 
throughout  the  grocery  channel.  However  manufacturers  and  suppliers  were  permitted  to  withhold 
supplies in cases where a retailer sold a product at a price that was below wholesale cost before the 
deductions of quantity discounts.  
 
In 1972 a futher enquiry into the grocery trade was conducted.  At this stage the structure of the industry had 
changed significantly.  The multiple retailers’ bargaining power had increased noticeably and was such that 
they could now negotiate terms on a par with wholesalers.  This was despite the fact that manufacturers and 
suppliers incurred higher costs when distributing directly to individual retail stores. Also, multiple grocers 
were negotiating supplementary terms over and above those justified by economies of order size (FTC 1972).  
There was also evidence of an increasing use of below cost selling (sale below purchase price) which was 
usually combined with intensive advertising by the retailer to encourage customer traffic. Despite the fact 
that  manufacturers  possessed  the  right  to  withhold  supplies  under  these  conditions,  and  indeed  were 
frequently encouraged to do so by certain sectors of the grocery trade, they rarely did. Suppliers clearly 
disliked the practice of below cost selling but the increasing availability of generic own label products and 
the fear that the larger retailers would simply source supplies elsewhere conditioned their responses. Multiple 
retailers’ power had increased to the extent that sanctions designed to counter undesirable trading practices 
were ineffective. 
 
One  of  the  more  interesting  features  to  emerge  from  the  Fair Trade  Commission’s  (1972)  deliberations 
concerned a possible prohibition on below cost selling.  However, even then, the insuperable difficulties 
associated with regulating retail prices, on the basis of a price paid by the retailer to a supplier when such a 
price could be partly determined by future discounts, were recognised. The Fair Trade Commission’s (1972) 
clearly recognised that below cost selling was taking place but rather than deal with it directly they adopted 
an indirect approach and recommended that a ban on below cost advertising should be introduced. Their view 
was  that  widespread  advertising  of  below  cost  prices  might  generate  a  misleading  impression  of  large 
retailers’ overall price levels (Massey and O'Hare, 1996) and that a ban on advertising would restrict the 
benefits of below cost selling and reduce its incidence.  
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This was duly incorporated into the 1973 amendment of the Groceries Order with an important variation.  
The Fair Trade Commission (1972) recommended a ban on below cost advertising where cost would be 
defined as net purchase price.  Net purchase price would include tax but no reference was made to future 
rebates (FTC 1972: 225).  In the 1973 Order it is stated that the retailer should not advertise at a price which 
was  less  than  the  price  after  the  deduction  of  any  discount  (Department  of    Enterprise,  Trade  and 
Employment 2005). The determination of “any discount” was likely to prove difficult but despite this the 
prohibition was largely adhered to until 1985 when a High Court action highlighted the futility of such legal 
activity and there were no further prosecutions (Restrictive Practices Commission, 1987). 
 
In 1978 an Irish food manufacturer refused to withhold supplies from a particular retailer who, allegedly, had 
been selling below cost. Under the 1972 amendment to the Groceries Order, the right to withhold food 
supplies from a retailer for below cost selling, had been removed.  However it appears that this change was 
not  fully  appreciated  among  the  trade  and  a  boycott  of  the  manufacturer  ensued  by  wholesalers  and 
independent retailers.  The Restrictive Practices Commission (RPC) considered the case and recommended 
that the right to withhold food supplies from outlets selling at or below cost be re-introduced into the Order.  
Cost  was  defined  as  net  invoice  price  plus  value  added  tax  (Department  of    Enterprise,  Trade  and 
Employment 2006; appendix five).  Further clarity to this definition of cost was to emerge through a High 
Court judgement in 1978. Once again the issue of defining net invoice price to include future rebates arose. 
The judgement ruled that the net invoice price could not be equated with the real price that would depend on 
the size of future rebates. The implications of this judgment  were far reaching: for  the purposes of the 
Groceries Order, net invoice price excluded off-invoice discounts.  Any remaining doubt was removed with 
the addition of this definition to the 1981 Groceries Order.  
 
The prohibition of below cost selling 
 
It is notable that even at this stage, there was no prohibition against below cost selling. In its 1980 review of 
the grocery trade, the Restrictive Practices Commission maintained the view that the prohibition on below 
cost advertising was sufficient and that a ban on below cost selling was not justified. However there was 
mounting evidence that increasing competition among the multiple retailers was leading to widespread below 
cost selling (Yates 1984).  By 1986 the matter had reached a stage where the then Minister for Industry and 
Commerce requested that the Restrictive Practices Commission explicitly investigate and review the issue of 
below cost selling. In its report, the Restrictive Practices Commission (1987) recommended a ban on below 
cost selling for four reasons.  First, and most importantly it was clear that the prohibition on below cost 
advertising was not proving effective in reducing the extent of below cost selling.  Second, the growth in the 
multiples' share of the grocery market was causing concern and was believed to threaten the viability of the 
independent sector.  The share of trade accounted for by the top three multiple operators was 44.4% in 1983. 
This rose rapidly to 56.1% by the end of 1987 (Table 1). Third there was evidence of the growing power of 
the  multiple  retailers  within  the  relationship  with  suppliers.  The  shift  in  power  was  partly  reflected  in 
manufacturers’ practice of providing additional allowances to retailers as an incentive not to sell below cost.  
These allowances were considered undesirable and discriminatory.  In particular, they were most likely to 
discriminate  against  the  independent  sector  and  continue  to  fuel  the  concentration  process.  Fourth,  the 
practice of below cost selling caused considerable difficulties to suppliers.  On the one hand, suppliers had to 
contend  with  inefficiencies  in  production  and  stockholding  to  cater  for  the  irregular  demand  patterns 
resulting from below cost promotions and, on the other hand, they faced considerable pressure from other 
customers who wished to match their competitor’s prices.  
 
The Commission’s recommendation, that there should be a ban on below cost selling, based on the view that 
the practice was “intrinsically unfair”, were incorporated into the Groceries Order 1987 and came into force 
in December 1987.  Below cost was defined in terms of net invoice cost including value added tax. That this 
could lead to a form of resale price maintenance was recognised but the view taken was that competition 
would depress invoice prices (RPC 1987:49). The ban was to extend across grocery goods, defined as “goods 
for human consumption (excluding fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, fresh and frozen meat, fresh and frozen fish 
which  has  undergone  no  processing  other  than  freezing  with  or  without  preservatives)  and  intoxicating 
liquors not for consumption on the premises and such household necessaries (other than foodstuffs) as are 5 
ordinarily sold in grocery shops and includes grocery goods designated as ‘own label’, ‘generic’ or other 
similar description” (SI No 142 of 1987).  
 
Table 1.  Concentration in the Grocery Market: Market Share by Company  
 
Retailer  Dec 1983  Dec 1987 
Dunnes Stores  17.4  25.4 
Power Supermarkets  18.5  24.5 
SuperQuinn  6.6  6.2 
Tesco  8.4  0.0 
Multiples (CR3)
1  44.3  56.1 
SuperValu
2  6.3  7.0 
Total (CR3)  44.3  56.9 
Total (CR4)  50.9  63.1 
SSource: Taylor Nelson AGB.  
1 Multiple (CR3) refers to the share of trade attributable to the three largest multiple  
2 outlets.  The Total CR3 refers to the share of trade attributable to the largest 3  
bbuying organisations including SuperValu. 
3 SuperValu stores are independently owned but trade under a wholesaler  




In summary, the prohibition of below cost selling was introduced largely as a result of increasing retailer 
concentration and buying power, the demise of the independent sector and the “views of manufacturers and 
retailers  that  it  would  make  a  significant  difference  to  them”.    On  the  consumers’  side,  one  argument 
presented in favour of the ban was that it would “seem likely that a wider range of products would be sold at 
cost or just above cost as a substitute for below cost selling so that there would be no net additional cost 
bearable by the consumer” (Restrictive Practices Commission 1987).   
 
However, there were problems with the legislation. The first concerned unintended consequences and the 
behavioural responses made within the trade.  The RPC (1987) held the view that while the net invoice price 
would ideally be the real purchase price paid by the retailer, they acknowledged that all discounts, rebates, 
allowances, and longterm agreements (LTAs) did not appear on the invoice.  Despite this, they took the view 
that competition among retailers would result in these supplementary terms appearing on the invoice and that 
forces would ensure that the net invoice price would equate to the real price of the products. By 1991, in its 
review  of  the  1987  Order,  the  Fair  Trade  Commission
1  recognised  that  there  were  difficulties.  The 
Commission in its 1987 report had recognised that by defining cost in terms of net invoice price there was the 
potential for suppliers to re-introduce a form of resale price maintenance through the use of off-invoice 
discounts.    By  1991  it  was  becoming  apparent  that  both  the  frequency  and  magnitude  of  off-invoice  
discounts (up to 25-30% )had increased considerably (FTC 1991).   
 
By  removing  discounts  from  invoices,  suppliers  could  in  effect  raise  the  minimum  retail  price,  thereby 
dampening the extent of price competition at the retail stage of the channel.  This is demonstrated in figure 1. 
This may have had an interesting effect on bargaining processes between retailers and their suppliers.  If 
retailers believed that a common net-invoice price was being paid throughout the trade, they may have had 
the incentive to negotiate for larger off-invoice discounts instead of negotiating for lower net invoice prices.  
With the minimum market price being determined by the supplier, the off-invoice discount became a quasi-
guaranteed minimum adjusted gross margin.  In addition to causing retail prices to be higher than they might 
ordinarily be, this opened up the clear possibility of substantial discrimination among retail customers which 
could threaten the competitive structure of the industry. As Grant (1987) proposed, the “principal effect of 
buying power is not to depress prices across markets but rather to induce price discrimination in favour of 
large buyers through discounts”. 
                                                            








In an attempt to ensure an equitable treatment of their retail customers, the 1987 Groceries Order contained a 
provision  requiring  all  retailers  with  more  than  five  outlets  and  wholesalers  to  supply  the  Director  of 
Consumer Affairs, who was responsible for enforcing the Order, with details of all supplementary terms 
negotiated with suppliers on a monthly basis.  However this provision proved to be a totally ineffective 
monitoring mechanism as it was impossible to implement administratively due to the volume of material (e.g. 
a typical retailer might have 20,000 products) and the way supplementary terms were paid.  
 
The three members of the 1991 Commission did not arrive at a unanimous view on the need to revoke the 
ban  on  below  selling  (FTC  1991).    The  majority  view  held  that  the  ban  was  a  serious  restriction  on 
competition and that, due to off invoice discounts, minimum resale prices were higher than they would be 
without  the  ban.  The  Commission  was  however  unanimous  in  its  view  that  net  invoice  price  was  an 
unsatisfactory definition of cost. Despite this, no further changes were made to the 1987 Groceries Order 






Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that a considerable degree of uncertainty surrounded the continuing 
existence of the Order. Grocers, manufacturers and producers all exercised strenuous lobbying activities for 
the  retention  of  the  Order.    In  a  rather  peculiar  twist  of  events,  the  Consumer  Association  of  Ireland 
supported the retention of the Order and the ban on below cost selling.  Even though the failings in the 
legislation had been apparent for so long, the evidence suggests that there was no clear political motivation 
for change. 
 
To understand the lack of change it is worth considering the unfolding economic environment.  From the mid 
1990’s the Irish economy was about to enjoy a decade of unprecedented growth. While overall inflation and 
food  price  inflation  were  increasing,  average  industrial  earnings  were  growing  at  a  faster  rate  (fig  2). 
Consequently,  it  is  proposed  that  grocery  prices  were  not  a  major  issue  for  consumers  at  the  time.  
Customers’ increasing affluence was also reflected in the product mix developed by retailers. The move to 7 






























































































































Despite the difficulties in actually determining the precise product coverage of the Order it was held that 
approximately 75 percent of the typical basket was subject to the Order Many arguments focused on the 
change in relative prices between those products covered by the Order and those products that were not 
subject to its provisions. This data is provided in figure 3. The lack of evidence supporting a clear and 
consistent divergence in both price series was used by proponents in favour of maintaining the order as a sign 
that  the  order  was  not  suppressing  competitive  forces  On  the  other  hand,  periodic differentials  in  price 











This  was  about  to  change  however.  In  20004  the  then  Minister  for  Enterprise,  Trade  and  Employment 
established the Consumer Strategy Group which reported on the grocery trade (CSG 2005).  Central to the 
group’s  critique  of  the  grocery  market  was  the  extent  of  off-invoice  discounts.    It  stated,  without  any 
supporting evidence, that these discounts amounted to an average of 18 percent for the largest retailers (CSG 
2005;80).  Given the legislation, these discounts could not be passed on to shoppers in lower prices. This 
figure received considerable attention in the media and was reported extensively. It was suggested that if 
prices were to fall by the amount of the off-invoice discounts, the typical household could save up to €1,000 
per annum. The Groceries Order was subjected to ridicule when a large retailer sold disposable nappies 
below net invoice price. The Director for Consumer Affairs, who had responsibility for enforcing the Order, 8 
took the retailer to court.  The retailer did not contest that it had sold the products below net invoice price but 
rather argued that disposable nappies were not a household necessary and consequently were not subject to 
the Order.  The retailer won its case!  
 
Other factors also began to emerge.  Food inflation in Ireland was considerably higher that UK inflation. This 
is despite the fact that Tesco was both Ireland’s and the UK’s largest retailer.  One frequently used argument 
to support this difference was that the costs of doing business in Ireland  were considerably higher and 
explained the difference in prices.  However, as pointed out by the Department of Enterprise Trade and 
Employment (2006), no such differentials existed in clothing, suggesting that the dynamics of competition in 
the  Irish  grocery  market  were  not  operating  to  the  consumer’s  best  interests  (Figure  4).    This  made  it 
increasingly difficult for the previously successful lobby groups who argued for the Order’s retention. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Differential Inflation Rates Between the RoI and the UK 
   
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment  (2006)  
 
 
All in all, the justification for the Groceries Order was being systematically undermined and finally the Order 
and the ban on below cost selling was revoked on March 11
th 2006.  The view was that the ban on below cost 
selling, defined as selling below net invoice price, imposed a form of resale price maintenance.  If they had 
wanted to, retailers could not pass on the off-invoice discounts they received from their suppliers to their 
customers and consequently it forced prices to be higher than they necessarily had to be. 
 
Developments on the supply side: 
 
On the supply side, the competitive capacity in the Irish Market was also beginning to increase.  Tesco had 
re-entered the Irish Market in 1997 by purchasing the Power Supermarkets chain of stores
2.  This chain held 
approximately 25% of the RoI market and Tesco’s purchase brought a new dimension to the competitive 
environment.  In particular, the fact that its British arm had an own brand participation in the region of 50% 
compared with 15% in Power Supermarkets, opened up the possibility of a radically new supply chain model 
with  imported  products  displacing  Irish  sourced  products.  To  allay  these  concerns  Tesco  gave  the  Irish 
government a series of undertakings  “such as to have a buying office in Ireland, to enhance the amount of 
resources the company puts into working with Irish suppliers to ensure that they, in turn, can increase the 
volume of sales in the Irish market. Tesco has agreed to bench-mark those commitments and agreed to their 
regular  auditing,  to  ensure  demonstrable  progress  in  increasing  sales  of  Irish  suppliers”
3.  It  must  be 
recognised that Irish sourced products could also include international branded products distributed by Irish 
agents, wholesalers or local ancillary offices. Tesco also committed itself to honouring the legal obligations 
as set out in the Groceries Order.  
 
                                                            
2 Most of the stores traded under the Quinnsworth name and a few under Crazy Prices. 
3 Dail Eireann – volume 478 – 22 April 1997 Priority Questions – Supermarket takeover 
Cullen Paul (2009) Tesco's high prices a strategy to meet profit targets. Irish Times May 12  9 
 Further developments ensued. Aldi and Lidl, the German limited line discounters arrived in the late 1990’s 
and  early  2000’s.    Rather  enter  by  acquisition,  these  companies  followed  an  organic  growth  strategy, 
purchasing and developing their own sites. As a consequence, the supply chain models they adopted were not 
scrutinised to the same extent as Tesco’s had been or were similar commitments to the local supplier base 
demanded. Also, their business strategy was based almost entirely on own brand products much of which 
would have been sourced abroad. Consolidation of the independent sector continued with chains such as 
L&N, Roches Stores and Pettits either being sold to or entering into franchise agreements with Musgrave, the 
country’s largest wholesaler.   
 
Over the 2000-2009 period, the number of primary destination grocery stores had increased by 73 percent. 
The significant inflow of new capacity pointed to a profitable industry. 
 
Table 2 Store Numbers in Ireland among Major Retailers 
  1997  2000  2006  2009  % Change 
2000-09 
Tesco  78  76  91  116  53 
Dunnes Stores  54  62  90  97  56 
Superquinn  16  17  20  23  35 
Supervalu  166  172  178  191  11 
Aldi  0  8  40  65  712 
Lidl  0  16  82  115  618 
Total  314  351  501  607  73 
Source:  Company  Websites  and  Communications,  Submissions  to  the  Joint  Committee  on 







Throughout  1990’s  it  is  clear  that  suppliers  of  category  dominating  branded  products  covered  by  the 
Groceries Order held considerable power in determining the extent to which retailers could compete on price. 
The dynamics of negotiations across fresh (not covered by the Order) and dry grocery (covered by the Order) 
differed substantially.  
“ we(in Fresh) were always driving it. We had the best promotions and the best marketing and the grocery 
crowd  did  nothing  as  far  as  we  were  concerend  because  they  were  completely  dominated  by  **** 
(international branded supplier name ommited)  and everybody else… We thought they (dry grocery buyers) 
did absolutely nothing, because not alone did they tell them what to do, they gave them their margin. The 
only big issue they had was once a year with the LTAs.  That was their big moment”.  (Buyer 1). 
 
In addition to controlling the retail price of their branded products, suppliers also indirectly influenced the 
price of own brand products.  The leading brand on the national market  ( which could be an international 
brands) set the price for own brands  where a price differential of about 10% applied. “Everything was 
dictated by the national brand where a category was dominated by a national brand” (Buyer 1). 
 
It  is  notworthy  that  the  abolition  in  the  Groceries  Order  did  not  result  in  the  anticipated  increase  in 
broadbased competition. Food prices in general did not fall and indeed continued to rise. On the contrary, 
figures obtained by the Irish Times from an internal Tesco Ireland marketing plan revealed profit margins of 
9.3% for 2008,  50% higher than those achieved in the UK (6.2%). The food price reductions that might have 
been anticipated by the Consumer Strategy Group did not materialise.  One of the reasons was that the 
economy  continued  to  grow,  and  it  would  appear,  all  elements  of  the  grocery  supply  chain  prospered. 
Customers  continued  to  willingly  pay  the  prices  retailers  demanded  and  there  was  little  little  reason  to 
change. “Up to recently everybody was making their margin and as long as you’re making your margin there 
is no incentive to change.  Customers didn’t care” (Buyer 2). 
 
Another factor that may have impeded a move to greater price competition was the rigidities that the 
nineteen years of legislation had introduced into the buying and selling process.  The structure of deals 10 
was highly complex. “Suppliers tried to maintain the list price and negotiation focused on discounts” 
(Buyer  2).  Discounts  mentioned  by  the  various  buyers  included  distribution  discounts,  promotional 
discounts,  settlement  discounts,  discounts  for  joint  business  planning  and  marketing,  incentive  based 
discounts, and harmonisation discounts and once the buyer had exhausted all the existing discounts “you 
became creative and came up with whatever bucket you could”  This was possible because “when you 
had growth, things were easier to get” (buyer 3). 
 
Negotiating deals was a lengthy and involved process.  With multiple category suppliers, teams of 6 or 7 
from each side would often be involved and the negotiations could go on for months.  “LTAs were separate. 
They were negotiated once a year. That was a serious process.  There were no rules. It was just down to the 
buyer  and  their  instincts,  knowing  what  they  could  get.  (Buyer  1).  Sometimes  negotiations  would  be 
escalated to the very top of the management hierarchy and if they did not go to the satisfacton of the retailer a 
supplier’s products could be withdrawn. 
 
The terms would last for a year and would have been difficult to unravel quickly. It was put succinctly by 
one buyer who said “LTAs had grown into a monster” (buyer 2) and generated considerable inefficiencies 
within  the  businesses.  The  off  invoice  discounts  were  an  important  part  of  the  retailer’s  margin  but 
because of the complexity of deals, “deal checking had become a little industry in itself” (buyer 3) using 
up resources that in other circumstance could be passed on to consumers.  For buyers it also meant that 
their true margin was less than transparent. 
 
The complexity of the deals also introduced rigidities into the evolution of the supply chain: It tended to 
favour the use of the domestic supply chain over international sourcing even in the case of international 
brands.  The structure and complexities of the deals, and the emphasis on off-invoice discounts, meant 
that negotiations between international branded suppliers and ROI based retailers and wholesales could be 
best negotiated on a local basis.  This was despite the fact that the top three purchasers of groceries had 
interests outside the Republic of Ireland.  The use of off invoice discounts, and the effect on minimum 
retail  prices,  would  have  meant  that  locally  negotiated  deals  could  yield  better  returns  than  those 
negotiated overseas.  This is likely to have suited and sustained Irish divisions of international suppliers 
by providing them with a clear justification for their existence. 
 
According  to  the  buyers,  eventually  a  combination  of  three  factors  led  to  a  significant  shift  in  the 
dynamics of competition and a revaluation of the sourcing models. During 2008, the rapid rise in the 
value of the Euro relative to the Pound encouraged a growing stream of customers to Northern Ireland 
where significant savings could be made. 
 
 








Unemployment levels with the seasonally adjusted standardised unemployment rate increasing from 4.8% 
in January 2008 to 11.9% in June 2009 also served to intensify shoppers’ focus on prices.  The continued 11 
promotion of the discounters by price comparison surveys undertaken by the National Consumer Agency 
highlighted the savings to be made by switching grocers. Taken together these forces prompted a gradual 
geographical rollout of lower prices by Tesco with its “Change for Good” Initiative  and Supervalu with 
its Sterling Price Match programme throughout  2009.  “The discounters had challenged our sourcing 
model” (Buyer 2) and this was soon reflected throughout the industry. On Tesco’s part, it involved a 
redesign of its sourcing practices and a substantial review of its product portfolio.  This entailed a greater 
role for its UK buying office with “Change for Good” plannogrammes sourcing international product 
directly from the UK. 
 
Dunnes Stores, the second largest of the multiple retailers, responded to Tesco’s border price cuts with a 
reported 30% cut in the price of a basket of goods throughout its store portfolio.  In the period January to 
June 2009, the National Consumer Agency reported a fall in the price of a basket of branded goods of 
between 14%-15% in Dunnes Stores and Tesco Stores operating the Change for good pricing initiative. 




The  evidence  provided  by  the  Irish  experience  of  below  cost  legislation  highlights  the  intractable 
difficulties of calculating the “real cost” of an item to a retailer. It was recognised that the net invoice 
price was a very poor proxy for the “real cost” but had the advantage that it could serve be a basis for 
legislation.  As  had  always  been  feared,  the  use  of  net  invoice  price  had  the  undesirable  effect  of 
encouraging off-invoice discounts and reintroducing a form of resale price maintenance.  The resources 
expended by companies in negotiating these off invoice discounts suggest that they were substantial. 
 
It can also be argued that the legislation when coupled with Government intervention during Tesco’s 
entry, impeded supply chain developments and the competition it might have created. More international 
sourcing, particularly for international brands and own brand products, would have challenged the quasi 
resale price maintenance model that existed in Ireland.  In such circumstances, the Irish model would 
have failed to compete and would have had to evolve to survive. It is fair to argue that the legislation did 
not prevent retailers and wholesalers re-configuring their sourcing models.  The problem was that neither 
retailers nor their suppliers had an incentive to change.  Times were good and budgeted margins and sales 
were being met.  It took a dramatic change in the fortunes of the economy and the rapidly expanding 
presence of the limited line discounters to change the nature of competition. 
 
The fact that prices were slow to fall after the abolition of the Groceries Order confirms the view that 
retailers would rather avoid price competition when possible. The industry had been conditioned. The 
negotiating processes and supporting structures had been established for almost nineteen years.  The 
industry, and it must be said, its consumers were not price driven. The legislation provided the means for 
supporting higher prices, through quasi-guaranteed adjusted gross margins, and perhaps even established 
a business culture that suppressed price competitive forces. It was always within the means of the various 
retailers to reduce prices while adhering to the legislation.  The discounters demonstrated this and the 
recent reduction in prices also supports this view. However given the rapid decline in the fortunes of the 
economy and the change in shoppers’ behaviours and motives, it is likely that even had the legislation 
being retained it would not have prevented the dramatic changes evident today. 
 
 
So to conclude, did the legislation really matter? The evidence suggests that it did and in a way that 
policy advisors feared.  Primarily, it served to dampen price competitive forces and maintain prices at a 
level higher than they might otherwise have been. The evidence also suggests that the legislation resulted 
in unnecessary complexities and inefficiencies to both suppliers and retailers’ businesses.  Finally, would 
the legislation matter today? The downturn in the Irish economy and the emergence of a very price driven 
shopper has forced Irish retailers to reduce prices considerably to maintain market share.  Any artificial 
constraints to reducing prices such as off invoice discounts would likely be removed and the move to 





Consumer  Strategy  Group  (2005).  Make  Consumers  Count:  A  New  Direction  for  Irish  Consumers. 
http://www.nca.ie/eng/Research_Zone/Reports/CSG_report.pdf 
 
Cullen Paul (2009) Tesco's high prices a strategy to meet profit targets. Irish Times May 12 
 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. (2005). Restrictive Practices (Groceries) Order 1987 - 




Fair Trade Commission (1956) Report of enquiry into the conditions which obtain in regard to the supply 
and distribution of grocery goods for human consumption. Stationery Office, Dublin. 
 
Fair Trade Commission (1972) Report of enquiry into the conditions which obtain in regard to the supply 
and distribution of grocery goods for human consumption. Stationery Office, Dublin. 
 
Fair Trade Commission(1991)  Report of the Review of the Restrictive Practices (Groceries) Order, 1987 
(Stationery Office, Dublin). 
 
Grant, R.M. (1987) Manufacturer Retailer Relations - the Shifting Balance of Power. In: Johnson, G. (ed.) 
Business Strategy and Retailing. John Wiley and Sons. New York. 
 
Massey, P. and O'Hare, P. (1996) Competition Law and Policy in Ireland. Oak Tree 
Press, Dublin. 
 
Restrictive Practices Commission (1987) Report of Review of Restrictive Practices 
(Groceries) Order 1981. Stationery Office, Dublin. 
 
Yates (1984). Second report of the joint committee on small business, retail and distribution. Stationery 
office. Dublin. 
 
 
 